CBI probes mule-account network across seven states, 13 arrested

What the Record Shows

The Central Bureau of Investigation has registered a case against 37 accused persons and, according to the agency, arrested 13 of them in a multi-state investigation into a mule-account network that cyber-fraud syndicates are alleged to have used. The case was registered on 25 June 2025 under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Prevention of Corruption Act, and forms part of the CBI's continuing anti-cybercrime drive branded Operation Chakra-V.

Per the CBI, searches were first conducted on 26 and 27 June 2025, during which 10 accused were arrested. The agency then carried out further searches on 16 July 2025 across seven states - the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan - and arrested three more accused described in its release as key persons in the network.

The CBI has not published the names of the accused, a case (RC) number, or any figure for the sums routed through the accounts. This report therefore names no individual and states no amount, because the official record does not. What the record establishes at this stage is narrow: a case has been registered, searches have been conducted, and arrests have been made. No court has been asked to try the matter, and no finding of guilt has been recorded against anyone.

The invocation of the Prevention of Corruption Act is the notable feature of the case. That statute applies to public servants, and the CBI's own account indicates that bank staff are among those it is examining for allegedly facilitating the opening and operation of the accounts.

How It Worked

The mechanism the CBI describes is a supply chain for anonymity. Cyber-fraud operations need bank accounts through which stolen money can be received, layered and withdrawn without leading investigators back to the offenders. According to the agency, the accused allegedly supplied that infrastructure by opening and operating "mule" accounts - accounts registered in one person's name but controlled and used by others to move criminal proceeds.

The CBI alleges that these accounts were then used to collect and move the proceeds of a range of cyber offences: so-called digital arrest scams, in which victims are frightened into transferring money by callers impersonating police or agencies; impersonation frauds; misleading advertisements; fraudulent investment schemes; and other online crimes. The accounts, on the agency's account, sat downstream of the scam and upstream of the cash-out, allowing money to be dispersed quickly across many destinations.

The Prevention of Corruption Act charge points to how the CBI alleges the accounts were created at scale. Opening a bank account ordinarily requires identity verification, and the agency's case is that account holders, intermediaries and complicit bank employees allegedly colluded to bypass or subvert those checks. Where a public servant is alleged to have abused an official position for wrongful gain, the corruption statute is engaged alongside the ordinary criminal law.

The procedural history so far is short and entirely investigative: case registration on 25 June 2025, searches on 26-27 June, arrests, and a second round of searches on 16 July. The CBI has separately said its wider Operation Chakra-V work involves searches at dozens of locations nationwide and that a very large number of suspected mule accounts - reported in the hundreds of thousands - remain under examination. None of this has yet produced a chargesheet that the CBI has confirmed, and until charges are filed and tried, the allegations remain allegations.

Who Lost Money

The victims in a mule-account case are not the account holders but the people defrauded by the scams the accounts are alleged to have served. Digital arrest scams, impersonation frauds and bogus investment schemes typically target ordinary savers and pensioners, and the money lost to them is what the CBI alleges flowed through this network.

The official record does not enumerate those victims or quantify their losses, and this report will not invent a figure. What can be said is structural: because a mule network by design scatters money across many accounts and withdraws it fast, recovery for individual victims is usually partial at best and often nil once funds have been cashed out or moved offshore. The value of dismantling the network, if the allegations are borne out, lies less in returning money already gone than in closing the channel before more is lost.

Where losses in such cases are recovered at all, it is generally through the freezing of accounts before withdrawal and through separate proceedings under the anti-money-laundering framework. At the investigation stage, no recovery or restitution has been recorded on the official file.

Where It Stands Now

As of today, the matter is at the investigation stage and nothing more. The CBI has registered a case, conducted searches on 26-27 June and 16 July 2025, and arrested 13 of the 37 accused. No chargesheet has been confirmed by the agency, no charges have been framed by any court, and no trial has begun. The re-verification for this report found no later official development altering that position: the investigation is continuing.

A chargesheet, an FIR or a provisional attachment contains allegations, not findings of guilt; the accused are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and due process continues. That principle carries particular weight here because the case is at its earliest stage, the CBI has not named the accused, and the Prevention of Corruption Act allegation against any bank employee remains exactly that - an allegation to be tested.

Anyone following the matter should watch for the next official steps: the filing of a chargesheet before the competent court, the framing of charges, and any provisional attachment of accounts or assets under the anti-money-laundering law. Until those appear on the record, the case should be read as an open investigation.

What It Means

For an ordinary bank customer, the practical lesson of a mule-account case is about how criminal money hides in plain sight. A mule account is often opened in the name of someone persuaded to "rent" their account, lend their documents, or accept a small fee to receive and forward money. Doing so is not a harmless favour: it places the account holder inside a criminal chain and, as this case shows, within reach of serious charges.

The protective takeaways are concrete. Never open an account, share banking credentials, or receive and forward money on behalf of someone you do not know, however plausible the story. Treat any unsolicited call claiming you are under "digital arrest" as a scam - no Indian agency arrests people over a video call or demands money to avoid custody. If money is fraudulently taken, report it immediately on the national cyber-crime helpline 1930 and at cybercrime.gov.in, because the small window before funds are withdrawn is when accounts can still be frozen.

The case also illustrates why insider facilitation matters. Verification checks at the account-opening stage are the first line of defence against exactly this kind of network, which is why the alleged involvement of bank staff, if established, would be treated as a corruption offence and not merely a lapse. You can follow how these matters develop through the Oquilia enforcement archive, and where a scam dangles guaranteed investment returns, a quick reality check against a plain lump-sum calculator will usually expose a promised figure no legitimate scheme can pay.

FAQ

Does this CBI case mean the people named are guilty?

No. The CBI has registered a case and made arrests, but a case registration and a chargesheet contain allegations, not findings of guilt. The 37 accused are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the investigation is continuing. No court has tried the matter or recorded any conviction.

What is a mule account?

A mule account is a bank account used to receive and move the proceeds of fraud on behalf of criminals who stay hidden. It is often opened in the name of a person who lends their identity or account for a fee. Using or renting out an account this way can expose the holder to criminal liability, as the CBI's case illustrates.

Why has the Prevention of Corruption Act been invoked?

That statute applies to public servants. The CBI alleges that bank employees were among those who facilitated the opening and operation of the mule accounts. Where a public servant is accused of abusing an official position, the corruption law is engaged alongside the ordinary criminal law. The allegation remains to be tested.

Have victims recovered their money?

The official record does not quantify victim losses or record any recovery, so no figure can be given. In mule-account cases, money is typically dispersed and withdrawn quickly, which makes recovery difficult once funds leave the first account. Freezing accounts early is usually the only effective route to protecting victims' money.

What is Operation Chakra-V?

Operation Chakra-V is the CBI's continuing campaign against organised cyber-enabled financial crime. This mule-account case is one investigation under that banner. The CBI has said its wider work involves searches at many locations and a large number of suspected accounts still under examination.

Where can I read the official record?

The CBI's press releases on the case, including the announcement of the searches across seven states, are published on the agency's official website, cbi.gov.in. This report is based on that record.

This report is based on the Central Bureau of Investigation press release dated 16 July 2025 on searches across seven states in the mule-account network case, and on the official record reviewed on 3 August 2026.